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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the role of cattle in the entwined dynamics of conflict and violence in the 
Fizi and Itombwe region of South Kivu province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. On the one hand, agropastoral conflict intensifies armed mobilisation, allowing armed 
groups to draw upon particular conflict narratives that generate popular and elite support. It 
also creates incentives for armed actors to engage in cattle-looting, or the defense against it, 
for both symbolic and material reasons. On the other hand, the presence of armed forces and 
the use of violence profoundly shape agropastoral conflicts. Importantly, they change the 
perceived stakes of these conflicts, and hamper their resolution. By showing that the relations 
between cattle-related conflict and armed activity are indirect, complex and mutual, the paper 
refines both theories on agropastoral conflict and those highlighting the role of local conflicts 
in fuelling violence in the eastern Congo.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 2011, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth the Congo) 
held its second presidential and parliamentary elections after the adoption of a peace 
accord in 2003. However, in the Itombwe area of the Hauts Plateaux mountains, 
located at the intersection of the territories of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira in South Kivu 
province (see Figure 1), citizens were not able to vote. Weeks of ongoing tit-for-tat 
killings between members of the Babembe and Banyamulenge communities impeded 
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the arrival of the voting material, which had to be carried on foot through the 
impenetrable Itombwe forest. While the reasons for this episode of violence are 
multiple, one of the factors fostering antagonism between the two groups were the 
repeated massive lootings of the Banyamulenge’s cattle by the Bembe ‘Mai-Mai’ (a 
generic name for small-scale armed groups drawing on discourses of autochthony and 
self-defense) of self-proclaimed ‘General’ Aoci in the Mibunda area. The Babembe, 
for their part, resented the occasional destruction of their fields by the 
Banyamulenge’s cattle, and deeply distrusted the Banyamulenge rebel movement 
Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) believed to protect this community’s cows. 
This episode of violence thus points to the complex interplay between cattle-related 
tensions, armed group activity, and inter-community conflicts, which is an important 
driver of instability in Fizi and the Itombwe part of Mwenga. 
 Drawing on over a year of intermittent ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
between 2010 and 2014 by each author individually, this article analyses the relations 
between agropastoral conflict and armed activity in one subarea of the eastern Congo. 
How do the presence of state and non-state armed forces and the eruption of violence 
in past and present change the dynamics of agropastoral conflicts? And in what ways 
do disputes between cattle-keepers and farmers shape the social and discursive 
practices of armed actors? By analysing these questions, the article aims to contribute 
to the cross-fertilisation of two bodies of literature that have hitherto often remained 
separate, namely, works studying pastoralism and agropastoral conflict on the one 
hand, and those focusing on the microdynamics of violent conflict, in particular 
armed group activity, on the other. In this manner, we intend to refine theories 
highlighting the role of local conflicts in the ongoing violence in the eastern Congo, 
which are part of a wider ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding practice and analysis (Hughes 
et al. 2015). 
In the parts of Fizi and Itombwe studied herein, agropastoral conflicts, which 
often overlap with wider inter-community tensions, intersect with armed actor 
activity, notably cattle-looting and the defence against it. This intersection transforms 
the nature of both armed mobilisation and agropastoral conflict. On the one hand, 
agropastoral conflicts intensify the mobilisation of armed groups, as they allow the 
latter to draw upon particular conflict narratives that generate popular and elite 
support. Furthermore, these conflicts shape the practices of both state and non-state 
armed actors, incentivising them to engage in either cattle-looting or its prevention, 
for both symbolic and material reasons. On the other hand, the presence of armed 
forces and the use of violence in past and present profoundly influence agropastoral 
conflicts. Importantly, they change the perceived stakes of these conflicts by adding a 
layer of (existential) threat, and erode mechanisms to achieve their non-violent 
resolution. Our analysis thus demonstrates that there is no linear causal relationship 
between local conflicts and violence. Rather, the mechanisms linking these two 
phenomena pass through various intermediary stages, which are crucially shaped by 
the presence and practices of both armed groups and the national armed forces, in 
particular the latter’s tendency to engage in particularistic protection arrangements, 
which undermines their perceived neutrality. Armed group presence, in turn, is not a 
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direct outcome of local conflicts either, as armed mobilisation requires sustained 
financial and organisational inputs that are often provided by political elites who are 
not always a direct party to agropastoral conflicts. Furthermore, we show that the 
links between local conflicts and armed mobilisation and violence are not 
unidirectional, but mutual: the presence of armed forces and the occurrence of 
violence crucially alter the nature of conflict. 
The paper is organised as follows. After a brief discussion of the literature on 
violent agropastoral conflict, we turn to the context of Fizi and Itombwe, describing 
the ways in which cattle-related disputes in this region have historically become 
intertwined with inter-community conflict and warfare. Subsequently, we analyse 
how the legacies of the Congo Wars have transformed conflicts related to 
transhumance, highlighting the importance of ethnic framings, autochthony 
discourses and armed group presence, and how these phenomena hamper conflict 
regulation. The next two sections discuss armed group activity, focusing on how it 
induces both the multiplication and the militarisation of cattle-related conflicts and 
changes their stakes. Subsequently, we examine the role of the Congolese national 
army, illustrating how popular distrust towards the army and its tendency to engage in 
protection practices are crucial factors in linking conflicts to armed group activity. 
The concluding section details the implications of our findings for the theorisation of 
the links between agropastoral conflicts and violence and of the role of local conflicts 
in armed mobilisation and violence in the eastern Congo more generally. 
 
 
THEORISING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN AGROPASTORAL CONFLICT 
AND VIOLENCE 
 
Conflicts between what we will call herein–despite the term’s problematic 
connotations1– ‘communities’ depending predominantly on livestock keeping 
(herders/pastoralists) on the one hand, and those primarily engaged in crop farming 
(farmers/agriculturalists) on the other, abound in Sub-Saharan Africa. While there is 
an extensive literature on the drivers of these conflicts, there has been less systematic 
study of the questions why, when and how these conflicts contribute to violence. One 
reason is that many studies fail to make a sharp conceptual distinction between 
conflicts and violence and do not always differentiate between different types of 
violence, for instance communal, interpersonal and armed group violence (Hussein et 
al. 1999). Moreover, only few studies examine the microdynamics of violence, which 
requires the comprehensive study of individual instances of violence and the 
processes leading up to them, while distinguishing between broader underlying causes 
and immediate triggers (Collins 2008). In sum, much of the literature fails to 
disaggregate the dynamics of conflict from the dynamics of violence. However, as 
argued by Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 426): ‘violence is not a quantitative degree of 
conflict, but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics’.  
The analytical imprecisions regarding violence and its drivers are clear when 
looking at the explanatory factors that are commonly cited in the literature on violent 
	 4	
agropastoral conflict. These fall into four broad categories: 1) changing patterns of 
resources use due to environmental and demographic factors; 2) ‘culture’ and 
identity-related factors; 3) political and institutional factors, often related to 
mechanisms of dispute resolution and elite behaviour; and 4) the proliferation of 
small arms. Not only is there no consensus on the relative causal weight of each of 
these factors, the causal pathways by which they lead up to violence often remain 
unspecified (Eaton 2008). A clear example are studies highlighting environmental 
factors, like drought, ecological degradation and demographic increase, which are 
posited to lead to growing competition for resources induced by ‘scarcity’ (e.g., 
Markakis 1997; cf. Homer-Dixon 1999). Yet while it is generally recognised that 
environmental degradation and growing pressures on land might intensify conflicts, 
many scholars point to the analytical inadequacies of the notion of ‘resource scarcity’, 
and emphasise that the link with violence is not self-evident (Hagmann 2005; Bogale 
& Korf 2007).  
 Similar concerns have been raised in relation to explanations focusing on 
‘culture’ and identities, in particular those considering forms of violence, like violent 
cattle-raiding, a ‘normal’ feature of particular pastoralist communities’ life-worlds 
and regulatory mechanisms (Hendrickson et al.1996; Abbink 1998). Yet, few studies 
focusing on customs and forms of social identification are primordialist or determinist 
in nature. Instead, the majority ascribe hostile mutual representations held by 
pastoralists and farmers to a complex interplay of on the one hand, discourses of 
ethnicity, and on the other hand, political and socio-economic processes, like the 
negative stereotyping of pastoralists in state discourse (e.g. Umar 1997) or intra-group 
competition leading to ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Breusers et al.1998). Some of these 
studies have also drawn attention to the importance of discourses of autochthony, 
which frame (semi)nomadic pastoralists as ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’, while 
identifying farmers as ‘natives/indigenous’ or ‘sons/daughters of the soil’ (Tonah 
2003; Pelican 2009). Similar to discourses of ethnicity (Brubaker & Laitin 1998), the 
role of notions of autochthony in sparking violence, however, is by no means 
straightforward, and tends to be assumed rather than proven (Verweijen 2015a).  
A third cluster of explanations for violent herder-farmer conflicts highlights 
political and institutional factors, including the erosion of established mechanisms of 
conflict resolution and the co-operative management of natural resources. The 
effectiveness of state institutions, like formal courts and state administrators providing 
litigation, may be undermined when there is reduced trust related to perceptions of 
bias (Harshbarger 1995) or corruption (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). Customary 
authority often erodes as a result of factors like diminishing cohesion among elders; 
the proliferation of arms-bearing youth and changes in the political system, such as 
decentralisation processes (Mwaura & Schmeidl 2002; Beyene 2009). Again, the 
literature does not always specify how and why the erosion of established conflict 
resolution mechanisms leads to violence; not being able to resolve a conflict is one 
issue, inflicting physical harm, or supporting others to do so, is quite another.  
While the causal pathways toward violence often remain unspecified, one sub-
strand of the politically oriented literature on violence and agropastoral conflict does 
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conceptualise causal mechanisms more clearly. This literature points to the agency of 
political and military elites, and analyses how it is affected by political processes such 
as elections, democratisation and decentralisation (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008; 
Greiner 2013). Most of these studies focus on areas where violent cattle-raiding has 
assumed significant proportions, often as part of broader economies of violence 
characterised by rampant banditry (Agade Mkutu 2008). The emergence of such 
violent economies is generally ascribed to multiple interacting processes, including 
growing opportunities for the commercialisation of looted cattle (Hendrickson et al. 
1996; Fleischer 2002), manipulation by politicians (Greiner 2013), and the rise of 
politico-military entrepreneurs, including ‘cattle warlords/racketeers’, who engage 
‘guns-for-hire’ to carry out cattle raids (Krätli & Swift 1999; Odhiambo 2004). The 
literature focusing on violent cattle-raiding commonly also highlights a fourth factor 
identified as contributing to violence, namely, the proliferation of small arms, which 
is said to create new conflicts and to transform social relations, in particular between 
youth and elders (Mirzeler & Young 2000; Hundie 2010). It remains contested, 
however, to what extent the proliferation of arms contributes directly to violence. 
Some have argued that the effects are mostly indirect and are usually only manifested 
in interaction with other factors (e.g. Eaton 2008).  
While the body of literature on violent cattle-raiding discussed above offers 
quite specific explanations for violence, only a small part focuses on agropastoral 
conflict. The reason is that in most contexts, cattle-looting occurs primarily among 
groups of pastoralists, rather than between cattle-herders and farmers or 
agropastroralists. An exception is Beyene’s work on eastern Ethiopia, in which he 
concludes that ‘livestock raids are the principal cause of the failure of informal 
agreements to prevent conflict between pastoralists and agropastoralists’ (2009: 216). 
This observation also draws attention to the inverse of the question of how conflicts 
influence violence, namely, that of the effects of violence on conflicts. Violence is 
generally recognised to lead to breakdowns of regulatory mechanisms between and 
among pastoralists and agriculturalists, like friendship pacts, fines and compensation 
systems. Additionally, it fosters changing patterns of leadership, as it displaces the 
authority of elders to the benefit of local (politico-military) strongmen (more rarely 
women) (Agade Mkutu 2008). Furthermore, violent forms of banditry, including 
cattle-raiding, often become new sources of conflict, which may then come to feed 
into new rounds of violence (Krätli & Swift 1999). The resulting insecurity may also 
foster the development of vigilantes, which in some cases are relatively effective 
mechanisms for coping with cattle theft (Abrahams 1987). In other contexts, however, 
vigilantes may create yet more problems, as they start engaging in cattle-looting and 
other forms of banditry, or collaborate with deeply distrusted government forces. 
Moreover, vigilantes are sometimes linked to identity-based communities that are in 
conflict with other such communities, therefore ending up exacerbating communal 
conflict (Agade Mkutu 2008). 
The complex interplay between communal conflict and acts of violence, 
whether enacted by bandits or armed groups, receives growing attention in the 
literature on violence and (agro)pastoralist conflict. For instance, Eaton (2008) 
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analyses how mundane incidents like ‘seemingly insignificant theft’ (2008: 89) may, 
through mutually hostile (ethnic) framings, set in motion a dynamic of tit-for-tat 
killings that spirals out of control. In a similar vein, Fleisher (2002) detects an 
interaction between individualised, commercialised cattle-raiding and warfare 
between clans, arguing that ‘clan warfare not only serves to legitimise raids on the 
enemy’s cattle herds so long as the fighting rages, but also fosters and sustains an 
atmosphere of inter-clan enmity that provides support for cattle-raiding (…) even 
after war-time hostilities have ended’. This renders clan warfare ‘both a cause and an 
effect’ of commercialised raiding (2002: 131–132). 
  In relation to Fizi and Itombwe, we observe a similar complex interplay 
between cattle-looting by Mai-Mai groups and inter-communal conflicts between 
cattle-keepers and farmers. Thus, the analysis presented in this paper draws and 
further elaborates upon the line of enquiry set out by Eaton and Fleisher, who analyse 
the microdynamics of the intersections between different types of conflicts and 
different types of violence in a disaggregated manner. As such, it presents a fine-
grained understanding of the processes and factors driving certain forms of violence 
in the eastern Congo. 
 
 
CATTLE AND WAR IN FIZI AND ITOMBWE 
 
Each year, during the dry season, which lasts from approximately June till September, 
tensions in Fizi and Itombwe rise. As cattle start their descend from the Hauts 
Plateaux to greener pastures in either Lulenge or Ngandja (see Figure 1), fears grow 
among cultivators that their fields will be trampled upon. At the same time, cattle-
keepers worry about their cattle being stolen by some of the armed groups generically 
called ‘Mai-Mai’. The resulting tensions are not purely the product of fears for 
material damage: due to a long history of inter-community conflicts and episodes of 
violence, which have become entwined with cattle-related conflict, transhumance and 
cattle-looting have pronounced identity-related and symbolic dimensions, which 
shape the ways in which these practices are framed and experienced.   
While several communities in Fizi and Itombwe have cattle, the group that 
most depends on it for their livelihood, and who are locally identified as ‘pastoralists’, 
are the Banyamulenge. The latter are a Tutsi group whose language is considered to 
be a variety of Kinyarwanda, hence who are Rwandophones (Kinyarwanda speakers). 
Migrating in the precolonial era with their cattle from present-day Rwanda and 
Burundi to what is now South Kivu (Depelchin 1974), the colonial authorities denied 
this group a chefferie agrandie (enlarged customary chiefdom) of their own. 
Consequently, they had to pay tribute to the customary chiefs (bami, singular mwami) 
from other communities and had no land of their own (Vlassenroot 2002). This 
unequal access to land and local authority would become an important source of 
frictions between the Banyamulenge, and neighbouring communities, notably the 
Babembe, Bafuliiru, Banyindu and Bavira.  
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Figure 1. Fizi and Itombwe, showing approximate areas of armed group influence. 
 
 
In the life-world of the Banyamulenge, whose livelihood and well-being 
depend on cattle, cows are part of the same moral community as humans. This 
elevated status is reflected in a well-developed tradition of pastoral poetry and songs 
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and expressions that praise cows, like ntaco kiruta inka (nothing exceeds the value of 
a cow) (president of cattle-herders 2012 int.). Additionally, wealth, including the 
dowry (bride-wealth), is generally conceptualised in terms of cows (Rukundwa 2006). 
While this is also the case for certain other communities in the area, in particular the 
Bafuliiru, other groups, like the Babembe, have dowry customarily be given in goats, 
which creates obstacles to inter-marriage with Banyamulenge. Another general 
difference between communities primarily oriented towards agriculture and those 
focused on cattle is the conceptualisation of and value attached to land. Whereas the 
Banyamulenge see land primarily in terms of grazing grounds, for most agriculture-
oriented communities, land has not only elevated economic significance, as main 
source of livelihood, but also bears socio-cultural and symbolic value. Access to 
communally held land is a precondition for insertion into the community’s social 
networks, and is therefore a crucial underpinning of social cohesion and 
identification, not least as it ties people into a reciprocal relationship with the mwami 
(customary chief) and the lubunga (council of elders). This relationship entails 
displaying loyalty, including by paying different types of tribute like itulo (customary 
contribution), in exchange for basic forms of social security and solidarity, for 
instance in times of disappointing harvests (cf. Van Acker 2005). According to 
Bembe customary authorities, the connection to the soil is also spiritual, as the spirits 
of the ancestors, in Swahili commonly called mizimu wa mababu, are believed to 
guard the land, thus ensuring the connection between previous and current 
generations and between the community and its land (chief of Basimunyaka clan 2012 
int.).  
The nexus between land, social identification and political organisation was 
strongly reinforced by the colonisers’ approach to local administration, in particular 
their reliance on customary chiefs representing territorially fixed ethnic communities 
as intermediaries, which fostered the territorialisation of ethnicity and the 
ethnicisation of local authority (Muchukiwa 2006). These entwined processes sowed 
the seeds for the rise of a discourse that portrayed communities without a chefferie 
and land of their own, like the Banyamulenge, as ‘non-natives’ or ‘foreigners’ who 
did not have the right to Congolese citizenship. This discourse became particularly 
salient when the Banyamulenge stepped up their efforts to be accorded a local 
administrative entity of their own in the period following the Congo’s independence 
in 1960. Neighbouring communities experienced this activism as a threat to their 
lands and power, leading them to emphasise their status as autochthones or 
‘sons/daughters of the soil’ vs. the Banyamulenge as putative ‘foreigners’. This 
natives vs. foreigners distinction often overlapped with a dichotomy between on the 
one hand, ‘Tutsi’ or ‘Nilotic’ groups, commonly portrayed as ‘pastoralists’, and on 
the other hand, ‘Bantu’ populations, perceived to depend primarily on agriculture 
(Jackson 2006). It is this overlay with the autochthony discourse and its profound 
politicisation, rather than differences in life-worlds stemming from divergent 
livelihood orientations per se, that has been a crucial driver of conflict between the 
Banyamulenge and other groups.  
An important catalyst of the politicisation of autochthony discourses was the 
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legacy of the Simba rebellion that swept the region a few years after the Congo’s 
accession to independence. Inspired by the revolutionary figure of Pierre Mulele, the 
Simba rebels revolted against the ancien régime accused of complicity with colonial 
oppression and imperialism (Verhaegen 1966). Obtaining a number of quick military 
successes, the Simba were soon beaten back by an offensive of the Armée Nationale 
Congolaise (ANC), the Congolese army, which was launched end 1964 with the help 
of mercenaries and foreign military assistance. In response, the rebels withdrew into 
the Hauts Plateaux, where the cows of the Banyamulenge became their main source 
of supplies. This antagonised the Banyamulenge (Rukundwa 2006), prompting their 
self-defense group called Abagirye (derived from guerrier, French for ‘warrior’) to 
side with the ANC. The latter started to provide logistical support, including arms and 
ammunitions, to the Abagirye, who defended the Banyamulenge’s cattle against the 
Simba (Chunguti 2012 int.). Given that the rebels consisted mostly of Babembe and 
Bafuliiru, the fighting sparked by the counter-insurgency effort assumed the character 
of inter-community warfare, whereby cattle symbolically marked the fault line. This 
explains the prominent place that cattle occupy in memories of the Simba war, which 
is generally identified as the starting point of deteriorating relations between the 
Banyamulenge and other communities (Vlassenroot 2002). Hence, the violence 
enacted during the Simba rebellion substantially impacted the later development of 
communal and cattle-related conflict.   
A similar nexus of inter-community tensions and violence would emerge 
during the First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars, when the 
Banyamulenge rallied to Rwanda-led insurgencies that were resisted by Bembe, 
Fuliiru and Vira Mai-Mai groups. Again, cattle symbolically marked the fault lines, 
and were transformed into ‘war resources’ as Mai-Mai groups engaged in massive 
cattle-looting. In September 1998, between 3000 and 4000 cows were stolen in 
Lulenge by Mai-Mai elements of commander Ngomanya, provoking fierce clashes. A 
year later, another 3000 cows were looted near Kisanga (see Figure 1), close to 
Minembwe (chef de secteur Basimunyaka-Sud 2011 int.). In response to this menace, 
the Banyamulenge suspended transhumance to the distant Ngandja sector of Fizi and 
solicited protection from troops of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD), the Rwanda-backed insurgency that occupied large parts of the Kivu 
provinces. This protection arrangement was greatly facilitated by the fact that certain 
Banyamulenge, including those owning many cattle, held important positions in the 
RCD’s political and military branches, which were present in the Hauts Plateaux. In 
exchange for sending combatants to guard their cattle during transhumance, 
representatives of cattle-owners would give the RCD commander in Minembwe a 
financial contribution to pay for soldiers’ food and boots (Banyamulenge cattle-
owners 2012 int.). This arrangement indicates how during the Congo Wars, armed 
actors became closely linked to practices related to cattle, whether by being involved 
in its looting or in the protection against such looting.   
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF CATTLE-RELATED CONFLICT 
 
While the Second Congo War formally ended in 2003, armed group activity in Fizi 
and Itombwe continued, like in other areas of the eastern Congo. As part of the peace 
process, both the RCD and Mai-Mai groups were supposed to integrate their troops 
into the newly constituted national army, the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). However, many commanders and troops in Fizi 
and Itombwe refused to integrate, for a variety of reasons. Importantly, the logic of 
power-sharing created incentives for ongoing mobilisation, as those disappointed with 
the ranks and positions they had been allocated in the FARDC took up arms to 
negotiate better terms of integration. Another reason was severe distrust between 
communities and towards the national army, not believed to be able and willing to 
protect civilians in case of attacks, including from the numerous foreign rebel groups 
that continued to roam on Congolese soil (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 2013; 
Verweijen 2015b). In Fizi and Itombwe, the resulting feelings of insecurity were in 
part informed by fears for recurrent cattle-looting and transhumance-related conflicts, 
which mostly centre on devastated fields. These conflicts have not only become more 
numerous, they have also become more difficult to resolve than before the wars 
(Brabant & Nzweve 2013). 
  The upsurge in violence during the Congo Wars has deteriorated inter-
community relations and entrenched mutual distrust between the Banyamulenge and 
other groups. As a consequence, individual incidents related to transhumance are 
often seen through the grids of intelligibility of inter-community conflicts, thus 
inscribing them with wider (symbolic) meanings. In the words of a member of the 
Cadre de Concertation Intercommunautaire (CCI), a local agropastoral dispute 
resolution committee:  
 
Cattle herders are too proud, they believe that the farmer is a good-for-nothing, a 
simple slave. Sometimes they even move around without taking the customary chief 
into consideration. But while the owners of the herds are haughty, the farmers have 
disdain for the herders (secretary of CCI 2012 int.) 
 
As this quote shows, both sides accuse each other of ‘not wanting to enter into 
dialogue’. While Babembe and Bafuliiru often accuse the Banyamulenge of being 
arrogant, framing them as ‘Tutsi who feel themselves superior’ (civil society activist 
2011 int.), Banyamulenge describe the Babembe and the Bafuliiru as hot-headed and 
violent, ‘directly pulling their machetes’ whenever they get into a conflict (chef de 
localité Kakenge 2012 int.). 
The salience of narratives of inter-community conflict has also contributed to 
changes in the meanings and effectiveness of the itulo system, the customary 
contribution that cattle-keepers pay to the chef de groupement controlling the lands 
that cattle pass and graze on (Brabant & Nzweve 2013). Customary chiefs of other 
communities accuse the Banyamulenge of having seized upon the Congo Wars, and 
the political and military strength they enjoyed during that period, to reduce or stop 
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the payment of itulo, which is also increasingly seen in purely monetary, rather than 
social, terms. As a chef de groupement testifies: 
 
Before the war, they [Banyamulenge] paid the itulo without any problem; milk, goats, 
chickens, cows…But then, because they have become armed, they have wanted to 
impose themselves. Since 1996, I have not received the itulo anymore’ (chef de 
groupement of Basimukindje 2011 int.) 
 
While this reading is contested by Banyamulenge cattle-keepers, who generally 
emphasise that they have continued to pay, it is indicative of how distrust erodes 
mechanisms of social regulation. 
 The continuing presence of armed groups recruited from among certain 
communities strongly perpetuates the mutual distrust between cattle-keepers and 
farmers, and undermines the effectiveness of conflict-resolution initiatives like the 
CCI.  In particular, it makes each side fear that the other party to the conflict will 
adopt an intransigent attitude, as they can mobilise armed actors to back up their 
position, or take recourse to armed force when dissatisfied with the outcome of efforts 
to settle the dispute. Even when no party has solicited armed actors to intervene, their 
opponents may still believe this to be the case. For instance, they may suspect that the 
opposing camp convinced the Mai-Mai to steal cattle in order to take revenge, thereby 
destroying a previously reached settlement.  
Suspicions of armed actor interference in disputes are all the more 
understandable in the light of the widespread occurrence of this practice throughout 
the eastern Congo (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 2014). This interference tends to be a 
two-way street: on the one hand, armed actors impose themselves on all sorts of 
communal, family and inter-personal conflicts. On the other hand, civilians, including 
authorities, actively solicit such interventions, in this way trying to reinforce their 
own power position and settle personal conflicts and scores (idem). While the 
mechanisms channelling these interventions resemble those of Mafia-like protection 
(Gambetta 1993), they do not always involve monetary compensation. Rather, they 
may also stem from social relationships that primarily revolve around patronage. Such 
particularistic protection mechanisms are also mobilised for cattle-related issues. 
Armed group members may, for instance, intervene in conflicts related to cattle-theft 
or the destruction of agricultural fields, like by intimidating herders or farmers 
believed to have attacked cows. Unsurprisingly, such militarised interventions rarely 
lead to the ‘settlement’ of conflicts, as the disadvantaged party tends to contest the 
legitimacy of the used procedure. By contrast, these practices tend to aggravate 
conflicts, creating new grievances and feelings of injustice. Additionally, they may 
prompt the disadvantaged party to solicit protection from armed actors too, creating 
cycles of revenge actions that may spark wider violence (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen 
2014). Such violence is only indirectly related to the original conflict around 
transhumance or stolen cattle, and critically results from the practices of armed actors, 
rather than those of the (civilian) parties to the conflict alone. 
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MAI-MAI GROUPS: CATTLE-LOOTING AS AUTODÉFENSE? 
 
For several Mai-Mai groups operating in Fizi and Itombwe, notably the groups of 
Mulumba, Yakotumba, and previously, Assani Ngungu (2007–2009) and Aoci (2008–
2013) (see Figure 1), the stealing and ‘taxation’ of cattle occupy a prominent place in 
their repertoires of violence and income generation. During transhumance, 
combatants of the Mai-Mai Mulumba may show up on the road and demand herders 
to give them a contribution either in money or in kind, to ensure a safe continuation of 
their journey. They often call this itulo, thereby appropriating the discourses and 
authority of customary chiefs. The demanded amounts (usually referring to heads of 
cattle) depend on the intentions of the Mai-Mai group in question and the outcome of 
complex negotiation processes, which are strongly shaped by the type and degree of 
coercion involved. While in some cases Mai-Mai fighters may approach the herder 
and simply ask for a contribution, in others, they first encircle and capture the herd, 
making liberation conditional upon payment (veterinarian of Mutambala sector 2012 
int.). It also regularly occurs that Mai-Mai combatants attack herders, killing or 
torturing them. Another system of wealth extraction employed by Mai-Mai groups is 
more or less organised ‘taxation’, whereby herders pay a fixed amount for every head 
of cattle that traverses the Mai-Mai’s area of control. For example, at the start of the 
transhumance season in 2012, the Mai-Mai Aoci sent a message to cattle-owners that 
they would need to pay $4 for each cow passing their fief (Life & Peace Institute 
2012). Such ‘taxes’ have also been imposed by the Mai-Mai Mulumba, who tend to 
erect barriers on the road from Minembwe to Lulenge (see Figure 1), but may also 
collect ‘taxes’ during visits to villages, forcing cattle-keepers to pay 5000 Francs 
congolais (about $5) each (civil society activists 2011 int.). 
Aside from imposed contributions and ‘taxation’, Mai-Mai groups sometimes 
steal cattle. This either takes the form of small-scale theft, which may also be 
committed by bandits not connected to armed groups, or be massive looting sprees, 
with hundreds of cows being taken during well-prepared military operations. Attacks 
on cattle constitute an important source of income for the Mai-Mai. Cows are sold for 
on average $150–500, depending on type and quality, which are huge sums for the 
lower strata of Congolese society. By comparison, the official salary of an FARDC 
soldier was mid-2014 approximately $85 per month, with officers earning only 
slightly more (Verweijen 2015b). However, while for certain Mai-Mai groups, like 
the Mai-Mai Aoci and Mulumba, revenues from cows appear to constitute a 
considerable, if not the largest, share of their income, for other groups this is not the 
case. These groups derive a larger part of their revenues from sources like imposed 
contributions in kind (e.g. foodstuffs, goats) on villages, and various ‘taxes’ and 
protection fees levied at markets, roads, and artisanal mining sites (cf. Van Damme 
2012). Some groups, like the Mai-Mai Yakotumba, also receive donations from 
politicians, like national members of parliament, who sympathise with their cause or 
hope to gain votes in their sphere of influence, and who are commonly from the same 
ethnic group as the Mai-Mai leadership (UNSC 2011).  
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 In addition to out of monetary interest, Mai-Mai groups also target cattle for 
symbolic reasons, in this way hope to rally the popular and elite support that brings 
resources and recruits, and allows for enhanced social control. These symbolic stakes 
are reflected in the discursive framings they adopt, which portray cattle-looting as a 
form of autodéfense (self-defence) of cultivators against the destruction inflicted by 
cows, hence a legitimate form of violent action to defend the rights of cultivators. In 
the words of a member of the Mai-Mai Mulumba:  
 
There where the Bafuliiru cultivate, the Banyamulenge send their cows. When the 
Bafuliiru have cows, they guard them well and they rapidly apologise when there are 
problems in relation to a field. But the Banyamulenge, they do not want to indemnify 
the destructions caused by their cows. This is why the Bafuliiru have said: ‘If you do 
not want to guard your cows well, we will revolt’ (….). Mulumba still refuses that the 
cows of the Banyamulenge arrive in his fief and destroy the fields: the Mai-Mai 
Mulumba defend the cultivators (spokesperson Mai-Mai Mulumba 2012 int.).  
 
Mai-Mai groups may also present cattle-looting as an attack on the 
Banyamulenge/Tutsi community and its putative expansionist tendencies, hence a 
form of autodéfense of ‘autochthones’ against ‘invading foreigners’ and their 
ambitions to grab their ancestral lands. Such ‘invasions’ are sometimes also 
associated with transhumance, with cattle being imagined as a ‘vanguard’ occupying 
autochthones’ lands. Framing transhumance in such terms does not only reflect the 
Mai-Mai’s worldviews, but also allows them to capitalise upon existing frustrations 
among cultivators about this practice (Brabant & Nzweve 2013).  
However, not all farmers support the Mai-Mai. The attitudes of the population 
towards these groups are heterogeneous, ambiguous, and fluctuating (Verweijen 
2015a), and the same applies to their engagement in cattle-looting. The spoils of 
large-scale cattle-looting are generally not shared with the ordinary farmer, who also 
tends to heavily suffer from the resulting tensions and insecurity. It is therefore not 
surprising that farmers often state to regret such acts, fearing revenge actions from the 
side of the Banyamulenge (representatives local community organisations 2010 and 
2011 int.). Paradoxically, it is these very feelings of insecurity and fears for revenge 
that foster a certain support for Mai-Mai groups, especially in the absence of national 
armed forces perceived as willing and capable to protect the population. 
 Although farmers may have mixed feelings about cattle-looting by the Mai-
Mai, those whose cows are targeted–primarily the Banyamulenge–often do not 
perceive this ambivalence. Instead, they tend to assume that cattle-looting reflects the 
will of the communities out of whose midst Mai-Mai groups are recruited. Mai-Mai 
groups are commonly described as batoto or ‘the children’ of a certain community, 
which suggests a close link. As a result, cattle-looting is seen as an attack by an entire 
community on an other community. Due to the violent history of inter-community 
relations in this part of South Kivu, which resonates with the wider history of anti-
Tutsi violence in the Great Lakes Region, including the Rwandan genocide, the 
Banyamulenge readily regard such attacks as an existential threat. As a 
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Munyamulenge elder commented: ‘They [Mai Mai] are all the same. We will never 
trust them as we know what they have done to us during the war’ (village elder 2011 
int.). This perception explains why Banyamulenge armed groups may respond 
fiercely to cattle-looting, experiencing an immediate need to defend their own 
community, and discursively presenting their actions accordingly. Consequently, 
Babembe and Bafuliiru often consider the practices of Banyamulenge rebel groups 
like the FRF to express the will of the Banyamulenge community, including when it 
concerns attacks on their villages. However, here too, the relations between 
communities and armed actors are more complex than dominant narratives assume, 
and many Banyamulenge in fact do not approve of such attacks. 
 
BANYAMULENGE FORCES: PROVIDING ‘PROTECTION’? 
 
After the adoption of the final peace accord in 2003, the main military force on the 
Hauts Plateaux of Fizi and Itombwe was the troops of Pacifique Masunzu, a 
Munyamulenge commander who had revolted against the RCD and the Rwandan 
army during the Second Congo War. This unit, which was eventually transformed 
into the 112th brigade FARDC, was not eager to participate in the army integration 
process, in large part because Masunzu wanted to hold on to his power position on the 
Plateaux. Masunzu felt particularly threatened by two dissident Banyamulenge 
factions (led by Venant Bisogo and Michel ‘Makanika’ Rukunda) that emerged in the 
course of 2005, and that merged in 2007 to form the rebel group FRF (Verweijen & 
Vlassenroot 2015). The continuing presence of non-integrated Mai-Mai forces, 
including those responsible for massive cattle-looting, further reduced Masunzu’s 
enthusiasm for mixing his troops with the national army. Despite serious fighting, 
Masunzu’s brigade, which firmly controlled the Minembwe area, could not prevent 
the FRF from consolidating its hold over the Mibunda and Kamombo areas of the 
Plateaux (see Figure 1). Becoming the de facto governors of that zone, the rebels 
developed considerable popularity among the Banyamulenge population there, in part 
as the latter felt that they and their cattle were now better protected against the Mai-
Mai (village elders 2010 and 2011 int). 
Indeed, the FRF generally tried to defend the Banyamulenge and their 
property against the Mai-Mai, whom they portrayed as purely criminal bands, whose 
main activity is to steal cows. For example, the supreme commander of the FRF, 
Michel ‘Makanika’ Rukunda, stated: ‘For us, the Aoci are just armed robbers’ 
(Makanika 2010 int.). However, by ascribing the Mai-Mai purely economic motives, 
they downplayed that these groups also expressed grievances that were widely felt 
among the non-Banyamulenge population of the Plateaux. In particular, the Babembe 
in Itombwe felt threatened by the hegemony of the all-Banyamulenge FRF and their 
demands to re-erect a separate administrative unit carved out of the customary 
territory of other communities (namely, Minembwe territory), which had briefly 
existed under the RCD administration during the Second Congo War (Verweijen & 
Vlassenroot 2015). 
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 The mutual distrust between Babembe and Banyamulenge, and the general 
identification of the Mai-Mai Aoci and the FRF with these respective communities, 
caused individual acts of cattle-looting to often provoke chains of reactions that 
spiralled out of control. In August 2009, the Mai-Mai Aoci stole hundreds of heads of 
cattle in the Mibunda area of Itombwe, which provoked a counter-offensive by the 
FRF in Kabandja, allowing them to liberate a substantial amount of stolen cows. 
However, the FRF’s intervention sharpened inter-communal tensions, which sparked 
heavy fighting in the village of Kipombo, drawing in demobilised Banyamulenge and 
Mai-Mai fighters from the Second Congo War and other inhabitants. In 2010, the 
Mai-Mai Aoci again managed to steal hundreds of cows in the Mibunda area, which 
nourished further antagonism among the Banyamulenge towards the Babembe, who 
were blamed for Aoci’s behaviour. This climate of antagonism partly explains why an 
assassination at the end of 2011 in Tulambo, which stemmed from a commercial 
dispute around gold mining interests, was nevertheless interpreted in the light of inter-
community tensions, and provoked the cycle of tit-for-tat killings that prevented the 
elections from taking place in Itombwe, as described at the start of this article. 
A similar complex interplay between worsening inter-community relations, 
cattle-looting and armed group activity had occurred in the course of 2008 in the 
Minembwe area, after the Mai-Mai Mulumba and the Mai-Mai Assani Ngungu looted 
dozens of cows near Kitumba (see Figure 1). Discontent with the performance of the 
112th brigade FARDC controlled by Masunzu, cattle-owners supported a counter-
attack conducted by an armed group consisting of demobilised fighters and young 
Banyamulenge, which operated under the name Twigwaneho, Kinyamulenge (the 
Kinyarwanda dialect spoken by the Banyamulenge) for ‘Let’s defend ourselves’. Also 
described as the ‘Mai-Mai of the Banyamulenge’, this group surfaces in times of 
(perceived) need, sometimes in an ad-hoc manner, and places itself in the tradition of 
the Abagirye operating during the Simba rebellion (Brabant & Nzweve 2013). It was 
also the latter’s former commander Chunguti, active as a protestant army chaplain for 
the FARDC in Minembwe, who took the initiative to mobilise the Twigwaneho in 
2008. The justificatory and mobilising discourses employed by this militia mirror 
those of the Mai-Mai both in their emphasis on autodéfense and the invocation of 
supposedly antagonistic ethnic groups as the main source of threat, thereby 
stigmatising communities as a whole. As the Twigwaneho’s main commander, Raban 
Musemakweli Senga, explains:  
 
The Twigwaneho are there and remain a movement to defend the property of the 
Banyamulenge. Because even when they promise us reconciliation, it will always be 
the same: the Babembe will come after two days to pillage our cows. This is why, in 
every place where there are villages inhabited by the Banyamulenge, I have deployed 
youth that is part of the Twigwaneho (Musemakweli 2012 int.). 
 
The Twigwaneho, which started to wane in 2010, played an important role in 
securing cattle, not only by patrolling near grazing grounds, but also by 
accompanying cows during transhumance. Furthermore, they were deployed for 
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counter-attacks in case of Mai-Mai assaults, and to trace back the stolen cows. The 
Twigwaneho, however, were not universally supported among the Banyamulenge. 
Some believed that this initiative only provoked further inter-community tensions, 
preferring non-violent responses to cattle-looting (notables 2012 int.). Others were of 
the opinion that the Twigwaneho undermined the work of the state security services, 
setting a precedent whereby all groups mobilise according to their own insights and 
interests (school teachers 2010 int.) Yet, the security services are widely regarded not 
only as incapable of protecting lives and property, but also unwilling, due to a lack of 
neutrality. These perceptions, and the practices of the national armed forces that feed 
them, are a crucial factor in the nexus between cattle-related and inter-community 
conflicts and armed mobilisation and violence.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF A NON-NEUTRAL ARMY 
 
Personnel from the FARDC, in particular officers, are both directly and indirectly 
involved in cattle-related affairs. FARDC officers of units deployed to Fizi and 
Itombwe often intervene in conflicts related to cattle-theft or the destruction of 
agricultural fields, for example arresting suspected thieves or local authorities like the 
kapita (village chief), held responsible for the acts of their villagers. FARDC 
personnel may also be deployed to trace down stolen cattle, or attack Mai-Mai groups 
that launched cattle raids (civil society activists 2012 int.). Additionally, they 
sometimes protect cows during transhumance, commonly due to protection relations 
with the owners, whether on a purely monetary basis or in the framework of 
patronage. It sometimes even occurs that cattle owners give a cow directly to FARDC 
commanders instead of paying itulo to customary chiefs (community organisation 
member 2012 int.). Such private deals strongly undermine the perceived neutrality of 
the military, especially as these interventions tend to benefit cattle-owners.  
There are a number of reasons why the practices of the FARDC are often 
skewed towards the interests of cattle-owners. First, the latter have cows to offer, and 
therefore have an advantage in terms of courting the FARDC. Furthermore, in 
particular up to 2015, many Banyamulenge owning cattle had relatives in the FARDC 
units that were deployed in Fizi and Itombwe, who often intervened to protect their 
cattle. These units were dominated by Banyamulenge troops from both the 112th 
brigade and, after 2011, the (former) FRF, which laid down their arms and integrated 
into the FARDC in January that year. Additionally, there are many high-ranking 
Banyamulenge officers in the provincial and national military hierarchy who have 
cattle in the area, like General Masunzu, the former commander of the 10th Military 
Region. These powerful officers commonly manipulate locally deployed FARDC 
commanders to ensure the protection of their cattle (human rights defenders 2012 and 
2014 int.). It appears, however, that not only Banyamulenge, but also other 
Rwandophone officers (both Tutsi and Hutu), often from North Kivu, enter into 
protection arrangements with cattle-owners. While this is primarily related to 
monetary incentives, the fact that they speak the same language and share a high 
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appreciation for cows, as is characteristic for Kinyarwanda speaking groups, may 
facilitate developing relations.  
Even where such close linkages between Rwandophone commanders and 
cattle-owners do not materialise, they are assumed to exist by self-styled 
autochthonous groups, due to their tendency to lump all different Kinyarwanda 
speaking groups together in the undifferentiated category of Rwandophones. It is a 
hallmark of autochthony discourses that they revolve around a flexibly defined 
dichotomy between insiders and outsiders, implying that the boundaries around the 
category of ‘the Other’ are constantly redrawn, according to situational dynamics 
(Jackson 2006). Such boundary-redrawing, for instance to equate local (Tutsi) 
Banyamulenge in Fizi with Hutu FARDC officers from North Kivu, partly stems from 
the discursive practices of politico-military entrepreneurs. This primarily concerns 
Mai-Mai groups and their political supporters, including local authorities and 
politicians, who play an important role in sustaining these groups. By portraying the 
army as ‘dominated by’ and ‘biased towards’ Rwandophones, these violent 
entrepreneurs provide a raison d’être for Mai-Mai groups, allowing them to frame 
their (violent) activities as ‘legitimate autodéfense’ against the Banyamulenge’s 
putative plan to forcibly occupy their lands (Verweijen 2015a). That such frames find 
‘resonance’ among broad layers of the population is a result of not only of a long 
history of inter-community tensions, but also of negative experiences with 
Rwandophone troops. Due to the atrocities committed by Rwandophone-commanded 
armed forces during the Congo Wars, many people in the Fizi and Itombwe area have 
bad memories of Rwandophone soldiers. This affects perceptions of current troops, as 
reflected in the often-voiced expression muguu ilioumwa na nyoka ugopa muzuzi (‘the 
leg that has been bitten by a snake will fear the lizard’). Distrust is further reinforced 
by contemporary negative experiences with the armed forces stemming from their 
penchant for abusive practices, which is not limited to the Rwandophone components 
(Verweijen 2015b). 
The Banyamulenge, for their part, also have limited trust in the FARDC, 
fearing in particular ex-Mai-Mai commanders. Reflecting similar framing 
mechanisms as those underlying the autochthony discourse, in particular the tendency 
to lump together diverse groups in homogeneous categories, this distrust does not 
only relate to ex-Mai-Mai from Fizi and Itombwe, but also applies to former Mai-Mai 
from other areas of the eastern Congo, who are suspected to maintain links with local 
Mai-Mai groups. For instance, one reason why the FARDC could do little to stem the 
violence in the Itombwe area during the electoral period in 2011 was that the battalion 
commander, an ex-Mai-Mai from Walikale (North Kivu), was rumoured to have 
provided arms and ammunitions to the Bembe Mai-Mai of Aoci (village chief and 
elders 2011 int.). Such framings do not emerge spontaneously but are actively 
propagated by those who stand to gain from them, often local authorities and 
politicians sympathising with armed groups. Furthermore, these narratives find 
popular resonance as they speak to a long history of negative experiences with armed 
bands from self-styled autochthonous communities, who engaged in ethnically 
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targeted harassment and massacres of Banyamulenge on the eve of and during the 
Congo Wars (Verweijen 2015b).  
As the above discussion shows, limited confidence in the neutrality of the 
FARDC enhances the impulse to support armed groups in times of insecurity and 
inter-community tensions, even when people do not fully agree with these groups’ 
agenda or practices. Armed groups are seen to offer a last line of defence, constituting 
a counter-weight to an abusive army or compensating for its deficient security 
performance. However, since most armed groups are recruited from and seen as 
emanations of particular communities, this self-defense mechanism has detrimental 
effects on inter-community conflicts. Moreover and paradoxically, the insecurity that 
is created by armed groups is one of the main drivers of popular support for these 
groups. Similar counterproductive effects are generated by protection arrangements 
with members of the national armed forces: born from the need to shield oneself and 
one’s property against insecurity, protection mechanisms undermine the perceived 
neutrality of the armed forces, therefore feeding into dynamics of autodéfense that 
end up creating more insecurity. Within all these various self-enforcing cycles of 
insecurity, the national army plays a crucial role, mediating the interplay between 
local conflicts and armed mobilisation.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Analysing the interplay of cattle-related conflicts and armed mobilisation and 
violence in the Fizi and Itombwe region in South Kivu, this article has shown how 
such conflicts are impacted by both past violence and the present-day activities of 
armed groups and the national army. Due to mutual distrust between communities 
stemming from a long history of tensions and occasional violence, as well as from the 
contemporary activism of politico-military entrepreneurs, individual incidents 
surrounding transhumance or cattle theft become perceived through the lens of wider 
inter-community frictions. Furthermore, given the imagined blurred boundaries 
between communities on the one hand, and armed groups and army factions on the 
other, it is feared that parties to a conflict solicit protection from armed actors to 
reinforce their positions. As a consequence, existing mechanisms of conflict 
regulation have become eroded, which in turn increases incentives to indeed solicit 
armed actors to ‘settle’ disputes. While agropastoral conflicts are thus influenced by 
armed mobilisation, these conflicts in turn influence such mobilisation. One way in 
which this occurs is that conflicts provide grids of intelligibility and narrative 
frameworks on which politico-military entrepreneurs can draw to frame and justify 
their activities. Crucially, these narratives allow them to portray their (violent) 
practices as the legitimate defence of the rights of either cultivators or cattle-owners 
and their property. Moreover, they enable politico-military entrepreneurs to employ 
stereotypes to provide simple explanations for complex social phenomena that 
‘resonate’ among their supporters. In this way, these narrative frameworks and 
corresponding justifications facilitate the mobilisation of recruits and resources.  
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 Our analysis thus demonstrates that the links between cattle-related conflicts 
and violence are often more indirect than direct. In many cases, violence is neither 
directly related to the destruction of fields nor primarily enacted by duped farmers or 
herders. Rather, it mostly takes the form of clashes and revenge actions resulting from 
cattle-looting by Mai-Mai groups and counter-mobilisation by other armed groups or 
the government forces. Although armed groups are commonly formed on a mono-
ethnic basis and claim to represent the interests of the communities they issue out of, 
they clearly also have divergent interests and agendas, related to the ambitions of their 
leadership and political supporters. Additionally, while mobilisation to attack or 
defend cows is often framed as necessary and justified to protect the community, 
these framings are manipulated by politico-military entrepreneurs, and therefore do 
not always reflect the views of communities as a whole. Furthermore, discourses on 
the necessity of armed mobilisation for reasons of self-defence are lent crucial 
credibility by the meagre security performance and perceived lack of neutrality of the 
Congolese armed forces.  
By highlighting the complexity of the links between agropastoral conflicts and 
violence, and by detailing the involved causal mechanisms, this paper contributes to 
the debates on violent herder-farmer conflicts. In particular, it shows how wider 
conflict narratives, which are rendered salient through the social and discursive 
practices of both politico-military entrepreneurs and the government armed forces, are 
essential for transforming individual instances of cattle-related conflict or crime into 
wider frictions that may become militarised. Notably, these narratives contribute to 
legitimising violent practices, like cattle-looting, even when these practices are not 
directly related to the conflicts that are invoked. As such, our findings emphasise the 
need to disaggregate different types of conflict (e.g. interpersonal, communal) and 
different types of violence and violent actors (e.g. cattle theft by thieves, cattle-looting 
by Mai-Mai groups, revenge practices by army soldiers charged with protecting 
cattle), and to detail the interaction between these various factors and actors, in terms 
of both discursive and social practices. Such an approach promises to significantly 
advance the study of agropastoral conflicts in violent settings.  
At the same time, our analysis refines theories that emphasise the role of local 
conflicts in the ongoing violence in the eastern Congo. For Autesserre, ‘grassroots 
rivalries over land, resources, and political power’ (2010: 42) are a driving force of 
what she terms ‘local violence’.  This paper elaborates upon this analysis by detailing 
the causal mechanisms and processes by which local conflicts contribute to violence. 
As we have showed, armed groups play a crucial role in this process, but neither their 
presence nor their violent practices are uniquely or directly the result of local 
conflicts. Rather, their activities are also the product of the interests and visions of 
politico-military entrepreneurs, who are connected to and draw upon supra-local 
networks and discourses. Furthermore, armed mobilisation is strongly shaped by the 
perceived lack of neutrality and capabilities of the national armed forces as well the 
tendency of officers to engage in private protection arrangements. In sum, the links 
between local conflicts and violence play out in more indirect manners and involve 
more supra-local factors than theories emphasising the role of ‘the local’ seem to 
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suggest. Furthermore, the link between local conflicts and armed violence is not 
unidirectional, but mutual: the presence of armed groups and the occurrence of 
violence crucially alter the nature of conflicts, as they transform their stakes and erode 
mechanisms of social regulation, which contributes to these conflicts’ militarisation. 
Again, supra-local actors and discourses play important mediating roles in generating 
these effects.  
By drawing attention to the pertinence of supra-local processes in the ways in 
which ‘local conflicts’ contribute to violence, our analysis contributes to a growing 
body of literature that highlights the inadequacies of theories on violent conflict and 
peacebuilding that draw on reified interpretations of ‘the local’, arguing that rather 
than as a (spatially) fixed arena, it should be conceptualised as a shifting node in 
wider social networks and processes (Hirblinger & Simons 2015; Mac Ginty 2015). 
But a nuanced grasp of the links between local conflicts and violence is not only of 
theoretical interest: it is also crucial for understanding the intractability of violent 
conflict in the eastern Congo. In particular, it explains why relatively mundane 
conflicts or instances of minor crime, like the stealing of one cow, feed into wider 
cycles of conflict and insecurity that importantly sustain armed groups. These effects 
stem from both the discursive frameworks that these groups and their political 
supporters draw upon, which provide meaning to individual disputes and these 
groups’ own activities, and the feelings of insecurity that result from the employed 
conflict narratives and from armed group presence. Paradoxically, the responses that 
people develop to cope with this insecurity, such as protection arrangements with 
members of the armed forces and the formation of self-defense groups, only further 
undermine the possibilities to resolve conflicts in a non-violent manner, and often 
become new sources of insecurity. One reason for this is that such responses tend to 
(re)confirm the validity of the conflict narratives that politico-military entrepreneurs 
actively (re)produce, ‘proving’ the unreliability of the army and the hostility of 
‘enemy’ communities. These narrative frameworks thus become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, with each mundane conflict or each intervention by armed actors being 
seen through the related grids of intelligibility, therefore becoming new forms of 
justification for armed group activity and army manipulation. In this manner, the 
continually interacting dynamics of conflict, armed mobilisation and violence in the 
eastern Congo seem to have almost become a perpetuum mobile. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Although we are aware of the problematic connotations and reifying effects of the term 
‘community’ (Joseph 2002), we employ it nonetheless, in part as it is widely used in the research 
context (as communautés), hence concerns an emic concept that captures modes of reasoning that are 
crucial for understanding the social phenomena described herein. 
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